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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
James M. McCauley *
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Advertising
1. Requirement To Designate Lawyer Responsible for
Advertising
How does the Virginia State Bar (the "Bar") determine who in
a law firm is subject to discipline for a misleading advertisement?
An amendment to Rule 7.2(e) of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia (the "Rules"), effective June 30, 2005, allows attorneys
who advertise to file a written statement with the Bar identifying
the lawyer responsible for all firm advertising, rather than hav-
ing to include that identifying information in each and every ad-
vertisement. 1
2. Use of Deceased Lawyer's Name in Law Firm Name
Rule 7.5 addresses the use of law firm names.2 An amendment
to Comment [1], effective June 30, 2005, clarifies that a law firm
may continue to use the name of a retired or deceased member in
the law firm's name, if the lawyer was a member of that law firm,
if doing so is authorized by law or by contract, and if the public is
not misled as a result.3 This concept was formerly stated in Ethi-
cal Consideration 2-13 of the Virginia Code of Professional Re-
* Ethics Counsel, Virginia State Bar. J.D., 1982, University of Richmond School of
Law; B.A., 1978, James Madison University.
1. VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 7.2(e) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
2. Id. R. 7.5 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
3. Id. cmt. [1] (Repl. Vol. 2008).
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sponsibility, but not included in the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct (the "Rules of Professional Conduct").4
B. Conflicts and Joint Representation-Family Law
On June 30, 2005, the Supreme Court granted the Bar's peti-
tion to amend Rule 1.7, which addresses concurrent and multiple
representation,5 by adopting a series of Comments formerly un-
der Rule 2.2 [Lawyer As Intermediary] .6 The Court also approved
an amendment to Comment [8] which states that "a lawyer can
never adequately provide joint representation in certain matters
relating to divorce, annulment or separation-specifically, child
custody, child support, visitation, spousal support and mainten-
ance or division of property."7
C. Contingency Planning for Disability or Death
Does a lawyer have an ethical duty to plan for a successor to
assume responsibility for client matters in the event the lawyer
dies or becomes disabled? On February 28, 2006, the Supreme
Court of Virginia approved the addition of Comment [5] to Rule
1.3 (Diligence), explaining that a lawyer's duty of diligence to the
client should embrace planning for client protection in the event
of the attorney's death or disability.8
D. Settlement of a Suit or Controversy-Restriction on Right To
Practice Law
As a condition of settlement of a suit or controversy, a defen-
dant might require a plaintiffs counsel to agree that the plain-
tiffs counsel will not bring more suits against that particular de-
fendant in the future. Until September 1, 2006, Rule 5.6(b)
prohibited an attorney in settlement of a suit or controversy from
entering into an agreement that broadly restricted the attorney's
ability to practice law.9 The presence of "broadly" in Virginia's
4. Id. pt. 6, § II, Canon 2, EC 2-13 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
5. Id. R. 1.7 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
6. Id. R. 2.2 cmts. 1-9 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
7. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
8. Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 5 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
9. Id. R. 5.6(b) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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rule was unique. The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model
Rule 5.6(b), and the numerous states that have adopted the ABA
Model Rules, prohibit any restriction on the ability to practice in
this context.10 In contrast, the presence of "broadly" in Virginia's
Rule 5.6 has the effect, in some circumstances, of permitting de-
fense counsel, in the settlement of a civil claim, to restrict plain-
tiffs counsel from ever bringing similar claims against the defen-
dant. Virginia's move to prohibit any restriction, effective
September 1, 2006, places Virginia in line with the rest of the
states on this issue.11
E. Foreign Attorneys: Pro Hac Vice Rule
Effective July 1, 2007, the requirements governing when a non-
Virginia attorney may appear in a Virginia court, in association
with local counsel, changed substantially. The new amendments
to Rule 1A:412 of the Supreme Court of Virginia completely re-
wrote and overhauled pro hac vice practices. The amendments
were necessary due to problems created by the prior rule. The
prior rule contained few requirements, leaving pro hac vice ad-
mission essentially unregulated.13 For example, the prior rule re-
quired no written motion or any verification that a foreign lawyer
was licensed to practice law; there were no limits on the number
of appearances the foreign lawyer could make, nor any means of
tracking those appearances.' 4 Under the prior rule, the foreign
lawyer could practice generally and systematically in Virginia
without being admitted to practice in Virginia.15 The prior rule
stated:
An attorney from another jurisdiction may be permitted to appear
in and conduct a particular case in association with a member of the
Virginia State Bar, if like courtesy or privilege is extended to mem-
bers of the Virginia State Bar in such other jurisdiction. The court in
which such case is pending shall have full authority to deal with the
resident counsel alone in all matters connected with the litigation. If
it becomes necessary to serve notice or process in the case upon
counsel, any notice or process served upon the associate resident
10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b) (2008).
11. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 5.6(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
12. Id. R. 1A:4 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
13. See id. (Repl. Vol. 2006).
14. See id.
15. Id.
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counsel shall be as valid as if personally served upon the nonresident
attorney.
Except where a party conducts his own case, a pleading, or other
paper required to be served (whether relating to discovery or other-
wise) shall be invalid unless it is signed by a member of the Virginia
State Bar. 16
The new rule requires, inter alia, a written application and mo-
tion to appear pro hac vice, as well as supporting documentation
that the applicant is a licensed attorney in good standing in
another U.S. jurisdiction.17 Under the new rule, a non-Virginia
lawyer may only appear in twelve cases in a twelve-month span,
is required to pay an application fee of $250, must submit to the
disciplinary authority of the Bar, and must agree to be governed
by the Rules of Professional Conduct while practicing pro hac vice
in Virginia. 18
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Sanctions Order as a Basis for Discipline
Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct makes it profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to file a frivolous pleading.19 In
Toothman v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that an order entered by a circuit court awarding sanctions
against a respondent lawyer is not sufficient evidence, standing
alone, that the lawyer engaged in misconduct. 20 The trial court
held that the respondent violated Virginia Code section 8.01-
271.1 "by filing pleadings that were not well grounded in fact and
were interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation."21
The respondent had appealed the sanction imposed by the circuit
court but his petition was refused by the Supreme Court of Vir-
16. Id.
17. Id. (Rep]. Vol. 2008).
18. Id.
19. Id. R. 3.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivol-
ous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of ex-
isting law.').
20. No. 062630, slip op. at 2-3 (Va. Sept. 11, 2007).
21. Id. at 2.
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ginia.22 The Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings before a three-
judge court and had "based its case principally on the transcript
of the sanctions hearing held in the Circuit Court."23 The respon-
dent had "sought to adduce evidence purporting to explain his ac-
tions" during the course of the underlying litigation.24 The three-
judge court had refused to permit the evidence, stating that the
respondent could not "collaterally challenge the findings of [the
trial court]."25 The respondent had also been prohibited from in-
troducing such evidence to mitigate any resulting disciplinary
sanction. 26 On appeal the Bar conceded that the three-judge
court's evidentiary rulings had been erroneous. 27 The rulings not
only had prevented the respondent from contesting the charges
brought against him by the Bar, but they also had prevented the
respondent from introducing mitigation evidence.28 The supreme
court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.29
B. Premature Publication of Disciplinary Decision Not a Basis
for Reversal of Decision
A respondent lawyer argued that his agreed disposition of a
public reprimand ought to be vacated because the Bar premature-
ly published a press release about his case.3 0 The respondent ap-
pealed a public reprimand with terms imposed by a three-judge
court.31 The reprimand was imposed after a telephonic hearing in
which an assistant bar counsel for the Bar recited the terms of an
agreed disposition which had been signed by the respondent and
the assistant bar counsel.32 At the conclusion of the telephonic
hearing, the respondent stated he had nothing to add to the assis-
tant bar counsel's statements, and the three-judge court, "after
conferring, stated that it considered the Agreed Disposition a
'suitable disposition, and that it would enter an order approving
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Brown v. Va. State Bar, ex rel. Second Dist. Comm., No. 070162, slip op. at 2 (Va.
Oct. 19, 2007).
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
2008]
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the disposition."' 33 The respondent subsequently refused to en-
dorse the final order and contended that the matter should be
dismissed because the Bar had issued a press release about the
disposition prior to the entry of the final order. 34 The respondent
also argued to the three-judge court "that he had not agreed to
the 'disposition typed by the Bar Counsel' and would not agree to
'any agreed disposition of these matters."' 35 The three-judge court
entered an order adopting the agreed disposition over the respon-
dent's objections. 36 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia in-
dicated that the respondent had signed the agreed disposition
and had raised no objections to the terms of the agreed disposi-
tion. 37 The court affirmed the imposition of the sanction, finding
that execution of the agreed disposition and failure to object to its
terms during the telephonic conference precluded the respon-
dent's challenge to the imposition of the sanction. 38 The court also
found that premature publication of the sanction was not a basis
for dismissal of the charges.39
In an earlier case, a respondent lawyer challenged a press re-
lease issued by the Bar and urged the Supreme Court of Virginia
to reverse a disciplinary order because the press release was
premature. 40 The press release had stated that the respondent
violated the disciplinary rules of the Virginia Rules of Profession-
al Conduct (the "Disciplinary Rules") and that his license to prac-
tice law had been suspended.41 The court found that the Virginia
State Bar Disciplinary Board (the "Disciplinary Board") abused
its discretion in refusing to admit the respondent lawyer's prof-
fered evidence regarding the adverse impact the press release
had on his law practice and reputation.42 Such evidence was rele-
vant to the question of whether the Disciplinary Board should
lessen the severity of the sanction to be imposed for the respon-
dent's professional misconduct. 43 Although the court gave the
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1-2.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Green v. Va. State Bar, 272 Va. 612, 614, 636 S.E.2d 412, 413 (2006).
41. Id. at 613-15, 636 S.E.2d at 413-14.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 616, 636 S.E.2d at 415.
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Disciplinary Board discretion to determine what weight, if any, to
give to such evidence, the court found it was nevertheless rele-
vant evidence to the mitigation of sanctions and therefore admiss-
ible.44
C. Revocation of Law License for a Felony Conviction Based on an
Alford Plea
The Disciplinary Board revoked the respondent lawyer's law li-
cense after the respondent entered a plea in a criminal case, pur-
suant to North Carolina v. Alford,45 that resulted in her convic-
tion in a state court on the felony charge of embezzlement.46
Based on that plea and conviction, the Bar initiated separate pro-
ceedings under Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13(I)(5)(b) which
authorizes suspension or revocation based on a guilty plea or ad-
judication of a crime. 47 The Disciplinary Board revoked the res-
pondent's license to practice law.48 On appeal the respondent ar-
gued, among other things, that her revocation pursuant to
Paragraph 13(I)(5)(b) was improper.49 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the revocation, finding that the respondent's plea
"constituted an admission that the facts presented by the Com-
monwealth at the hearing on the felony charge would justify a
finding of guilt."50
D. Garnishment of Client Funds Held in Lawyer's Trust Account
In Marcus, Santoro & Kozak v. Hung-Lin Wu, a judgment deb-
tor hired two Virginia law firms to contest judgments entered
against him and a number of business entities with which he was
affiliated.51 The debtor paid each firm a retainer pursuant to a
representation agreement that permitted each firm to place the
retainer funds into trust accounts and periodically disburse funds
to themselves as they incurred legal fees over the course of the
44. Id.
45. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
46. Lee v. Va. State Bar, No. 071464, slip op. at 1 (Va. Dec. 7, 2007).
47. Id. at 1-2; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, para. 13(I)(5)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
48. Lee, No. 071464, at 1.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id.
51. 274 Va. 743, 746-47, 652 S.E.2d 777, 779 (2007).
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representation. 52 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the cir-
cuit court's order requiring the two firms to cease disbursing
funds from their trust accounts in satisfaction of accrued legal
fees and to pay those funds to a judgment creditor effective with
the issuance of the writ of fieri facias.53 The court held that an
"attorney who receives funds from a client for the future payment
of legal fees for services not yet rendered holds those funds in
trust."54 The funds, the court stated, compose a trust of which the
lawyer is the trustee and the client the beneficiary.55 "The Firms,
as garnishees, held the intangible equitable property interest of
[the judgment debtor] in their trust accounts and were under a
fiduciary duty not only to hold that interest but return the prop-
erty to [him] when the trust obligation ends."56 As such, the
judgment debtor's interest in the trust accounts could be attached
in garnishment by the judgment creditor, who enforces the lien of
his execution against property of the judgment debtor in the
hands of a third person, the garnishee (here, the firms).57
E. Power of Circuit Court To Revoke Attorney's Privilege To
Practice in That Court
In In re Moseley, the respondent lawyer filed a contract action
for his client contending that a consulting agreement in question
did not have an arbitration clause. 58 The defendant in the under-
lying case argued the agreement did, but both parties were una-
ble to find a copy of the document. 59 During an evidentiary hear-
ing on the matter, the plaintiff testified he had since found the
contract, that it contained an arbitration clause, and that he had
given it to Moseley, his attorney.60 The circuit court levied sanc-
tions against Moseley for failure to inform the court and opposing
counsel that he had found the document, as well as for filing fri-
volous pleadings and motions in the matter.6 1 Moseley then filed
52. Id. at 747, 652 S.E.2d at 779.
53. Id. at 758, 652 S.E.2d at 785.
54. Id. at 750, 652 S.E.2d at 781.
55. Id. (citing In re Equip. Serv., Inc., 290 F.3d 739, 746 (4th Cir. 2002)).
56. Id. at 755, 652 S.E.2d at 783.
57. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Harkins Builders, Inc., 45 F.3d 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1995)).
58. 273 Va. 688, 691, 643 S.E.2d 190, 191 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 691, 643 S.E.2d at 191-92.
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a second motion for judgment alleging substantially the same
claims as in the first action. 62 The defendant moved to disqualify
Moseley and ultimately asked for a rule to show cause.6 3 Prior to
hearing on the rule, Moseley wrote in an e-mail that opposing
counsel was "certainly demonically empowered. I have never seen
anyone who reeks of evil so much."64 He also described the mone-
tary sanctions award entered by the judge in the case as "an ab-
surd decision from a whacko judge, whom I believe was bribed."65
The court found that Moseley had a conflict of interest and or-
dered that he terminate his representation of the plaintiff.66 The
court also ruled that "Moseley's right to practice before the Cir-
cuit Court ... be and hereby is revoked."67
On appeal, Moseley argued that the circuit court did not have
the authority to revoke his license in that court as the revocation
of an attorney's license is governed by Virginia Code sections
54.1-3928 and 3934 through 3938.68 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the revocation of Moseley's license to practice in
the Arlington County Circuit Court, acknowledging that "a court
has 'an inherent power' to discipline and regulate attorneys prac-
ticing before it ... [and] that '[t]his power, since the judiciary is
an independent branch of government, is not controlled by sta-
tute."'69
F. Improper Criticism of a Court by a Lawyer
Lawyers using intemperate or reckless language to criticize a
court faced substantial punishment for doing so in recent deci-
sions by the Supreme Court of Virginia. In Taboada v. Daly Sev-
en, Inc., the court held that a Virginia-licensed attorney violated
Code section 8.01-271.1 by filing a petition for rehearing contain-
ing intemperate language critical of the court's opinion issued in
the underlying appeal. 70 After the court issued an adverse opi-
62. Id. at 691-92, 643 S.E.2d at 192.
63. Id. at 692, 643 S.E.2d at 192.
64. Id. at 693, 643 S.E.2d at 193.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 694, 643 S.E.2d at 193.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 695, 643 S.E.2d at 194.
69. Id. at 697, 643 S.E.2d at 195.
70. 272 Va. 211, 215-16, 636 S.E.2d 889, 891 (2006).
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
nion in the underlying case, the lawyer petitioned the court for
rehearing and included in his petition language critical of the
court's ruling, including language that the court's decision was ir-
rational and lacking in common sense. 71 The lawyer appeared be-
fore the court and apologized for his intemperate language, ac-
knowledging that it was inappropriate. 72 Measured under an
objective standard of reasonableness, the lawyer's petition did not
assist the court in determining whether to grant or deny the peti-
tion.73 Thus by interposing the petition for an improper purpose,
specifically to harass the court, the lawyer was subject to sanc-
tions under the cited statute. 74 Not wishing to punish the client
for the lawyer's behavior, the client was granted leave to file
another petition. 75 After considering the lawyer's unblemished
service to the Bar of more than twenty years, including service on
the Disciplinary Board and Eighth District Committee, the court
fined the lawyer $1000 and suspended his privilege to practice be-
fore the Supreme Court of Virginia for one year. 76
In Anthony v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Ninth District Commit-
tee, the Virginia State Bar filed charges of misconduct against a
lawyer for derogatory statements the lawyer had made against
several jurists, including a Virginia circuit court judge, the entire
Supreme Court of Virginia, and several judges on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.77 The respondent,
in various pleadings, letters, and other court papers, accused the
jurists of conspiring against his client to deny her equal protec-
71. Id. at 213, 636 S.E.2d at 890. The lawyer made numerous assertions in the peti-
tion for rehearing regarding the court's opinion. The lawyer described the court's opinion
as "irrational and discriminatory" and "irrational at its core." Id. He wrote that the court's
opinion makes "an incredible assertion" and "mischaracterizes its prior case law." Id. The
lawyer stated: "George Orwell's fertile imagination could not supply a clearer distortion of
the plain meaning of language to reach such an absurd result." Id. He argued in his peti-
tion that the court's opinion "demonstrates so graphically the absence of logic and common
sense." Id. The lawyer wrote in boldface type that "Ryan Taboada may be the unfortunate
victim of a crazed criminal assailant who emerged from the dark to attack him. But Daly
Seven will be the unfortunate victim of a dark and ill-conceived jurisprudence." Id. at 214,
636 S.E.2d at 890. The lawyer also included the following statement in the petition: "[I]f
you attack the King, kill the King; otherwise, the King will kill you." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 215-16, 636 S.E.2d at 891.
74. Id. at 216, 636 S.E.2d at 891.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Anthony v. Va. State Bar, ex rel. Ninth Dist. Comm. 270 Va. 601, 604-07, 621
S.E.2d 121, 122-24 (2005).
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tion of the laws and the relief she sought in a legal malpractice
case before the Supreme Court of Virginia.78 A three-judge court
found the respondent had violated Rule 8.2 of the Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct79 and imposed a public reprimand.S0 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision,
holding that the three-judge court had properly found by clear
and convincing evidence that the respondent had made state-
ments about a number of judges involving their qualifications and
integrity and that he made those statements with reckless disre-
gard for their truth.81 The respondent argued that his criticism of
the jurists was speech protected under the First Amendment.82
The court disagreed, stating that "[a] lawyer's right to free speech
is 'extremely circumscribed' in the courtroom and, in a pending
case, is limited outside the courtroom as well, to a degree that
would not apply to an ordinary citizen."s3 The court further
stated that those restrictions on a lawyer's First Amendment
rights are based upon a lawyer's obligation, as an officer of the
court, to refrain from public debate that would obstruct the ad-
ministration of justice.S4 In addition, the court stated, "[b]ecause
lawyers have special access to information within the judicial sys-
tem, their statements may pose a threat to the fairness of a pend-
ing proceeding, such statements being likely perceived as espe-
cially authoritative."s5 The court stated:
[A] derogatory statement concerning the qualifications or integrity of
a judge, made by a lawyer with knowing falsity or with reckless dis-
regard of its truth or falsity, tends to diminish the public perception
of the qualifications or integrity of the judge. Such a statement
creates a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the adminis-
tration of justice as a matter of law and is not, therefore, constitu-
tionally protected speech.86
78. Id. at 605-06, 621 S.E.2d at 123-24.
79. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 8.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge or other judicial officer.").
80. Anthony, 270 Va. at 604, 621 S.E.2d at 122-23.
81. Id. at 610-11, 621 S.E.2d at 126-27.
82. Id. at 609, 621 S.E.2d at 126.
83. Id. (quoting Gentile v. State Bar at Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)).
84. Id. (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074).
85. Id. at 609-10, 621 S.E.2d at 126 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074).
86. Id. at 610, 621 S.E.2d at 126-27.
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In another Supreme Court of Virginia case, the respondent
lawyer was the object of a show cause summons issued by a gen-
eral district court for failing to appear at a scheduled hearing
where he was later found in contempt of court.8 7 After re-
argument was completed, the respondent filed a reply "to clarify
the errors which [the judge] has so negligently and carelessly, (a
second time) failed to give consideration to, in these matters."88
The respondent accused the judge of 'skewing ... the facts' and
'fail[ing] to tell the truth,"' and of lying to the circuit court, to
him, to the Judicial Review Commission, and to the Bar.89 The
respondent appealed his contempt conviction to the circuit court
which found him guilty and sentenced him to four days in jail.90
Subsequently, a subcommittee of the Bar certified charges of mis-
conduct to the Disciplinary Board.91 The Disciplinary Board
found the respondent in violation of Rule 8.2 and imposed a nine-
ty-day suspension based on his prior disciplinary record which in-
cluded two public reprimands. 92 On appeal, the respondent ar-
gued that his criticism of the judge was purely opinion to which
Rule 8.2 did not apply. 93 The court rejected this argument and af-
firmed the Disciplinary Board's decision, stating:
We find no merit in Pilli's contention that he did not violate Rule 8.2
because his statements about [the judge] were merely statements of
opinion, rather than of fact. Pilli's repeated accusations that [the
judge] lied were assertions of fact that were plainly within the scope
of remarks proscribed by Rule 8.2.94
The court also noted its displeasure with the conduct of the
respondent:
Finally, we observe that these written statements by a member of
the bar of this Commonwealth, published in the form of a "pleading"
filed with a court, are more than merely a troubling reflection of the
author's lack of professionalism. Such statements also may have the
undeserved effect of diminishing the public's perception of the nu-
87. Pilli v. Va. State Bar, 269 Va. 391, 393-94, 611 S.E.2d 389, 390 (2005).
88. Id. at 394, 611 S.E.2d at 390.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 395, 611 S.E.2d at 391.
93. Id. at 395-96, 611 S.E.2d at 391.
94. Id. at 397, 611 S.E.2d at 392.
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merous lawyers and judges who so ably serve the citizens of this
Commonwealth. 9 5
G. Disciplinary Board Lacks Power To Amend Charges of
Misconduct Certified by a District Committee
In Pappas v. Virginia State Bar, a district committee certified
charges of misconduct to the Disciplinary Board. 96 After the cer-
tification, but pending hearing by the Disciplinary Board, the Bar
sought leave to amend the charges of misconduct. 97 The Discipli-
nary Board granted the motion and permitted amendment of the
charges. 98 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that
the Disciplinary Board lacked the authority to amend charges of
misconduct certified by a district committee. 99 The court said that
the amendment was tantamount to a new charge and the respon-
dent lawyer was not afforded reasonable notice and opportunity
to respond to that charge at the district committee level, as pro-
vided in the court's rules of procedure for the discipline of law-
yers. 100
H. False Statement in Application for Admission to Bar
In Bailey v. Virginia State Bar, a three-judge court found that
the respondent lawyer violated Rule 8.1, which prohibits an ap-
plicant for admission to the bar from "knowingly mak[ing] a false
statement of material fact" in connection with a bar admission
application.101 As part of the application process, the respondent
indicated that he had never been "a party to or otherwise in-
volved" in "any civil or administrative action or legal proceeding;"
or "any criminal or quasi-criminal action or legal proceeding
(whether involving a felony, misdemeanor, minor misdemeanor,
or any traffic offense)."10 2 The respondent, however, had been
convicted in 1997 of manslaughter in Jamaica and served a pris-
95. Id.
96. Pappas v. Va. State Bar, 271 Va. 580, 584, 628 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2006).
97. Id. at 585, 628 S.E.2d at 536.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 588-89, 628 S.E.2d at 539.
100. Id. at 587, 628 S.E.2d at 538.
101. Bailey v. Va. State Bar, ex rel. First Dist. Comm., No. 060098, slip op. at 1-2 (Va.
June 23, 2006).
102. Id. at 1.
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on sentence of sixteen months.10 3 He had also been the subject of
a United States Marine Corps administrative action and a Board
of Inquiry proceeding to determine whether he should be sepa-
rated from the Marine Corps for misconduct.104 The respondent
had also been charged with-and convicted of-four traffic of-
fenses in the continental United States. 105
On appeal, the respondent stated that he "did not 'knowingly'
make false statements on the application."10 6 He argued that an
employee of the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Committee told him
that he was not required to report the conviction because it oc-
curred outside the United States.10 7 Further, he did not report
the Marine Corps proceedings because they too were based on the
Jamaica incident and because he was not dishonorably dis-
charged.108 The respondent also relied on Small v. United States
for the proposition that foreign convictions cannot provide the ba-
sis for disciplinary action.109 The respondent also contended that
his false answers did not involve matters of "material fact."110
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the respondent's re-
liance on advice from another jurisdiction and his reliance on
Small.11l The Court also held that "[i]t strains logic to suggest
that participation in criminal and military disciplinary proceed-
ings, as well as repeated traffic violations, while not dispositive to
the admission decision, would not be material to that decision."11 2
I. Lawyer as Pro Se Litigant in His Own Divorce Is Subject to
Discipline for Ethical Duties a Lawyer Owes to a Client
Barrett v. Virginia State BarZZ3 confirms the oft-repeated adage
"a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client." 114 The
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 385-86 (2005).
110. Bailey, No. 060098, slip op. at 3.
111. Id. at 2-3.
112. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
113. Barrett v. Va. State Bar, ex rel. Second Dist. Comm., 272 Va. 260, 634 S.E.2d 341
(2006).
114. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991).
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respondent lawyer engaged in litigation misconduct in a hotly
contested divorce from his wife and was found to have violated
several rules of conduct.11D The three-judge court found that in
the course of representing himself in three cases, the respondent
used tactics calculated to embarrass, delay, or burden other per-
sons; committed a deliberately wrongful act that reflected ad-
versely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer;
made frivolous claims; and acted incompetently as an attorney.1 1 6
The respondent appealed the three-judge court's suspension of his
law license for thirty months to the Supreme Court of Virginia.1 17
On appeal to the supreme court, the respondent contended that
the three-judge court erred in failing to grant his demurrer to the
Bar's complaint; that the violations of Rules 1.1,118 3.1,119
3.4(j),120 and 4.4121 did not apply as he was not representing a
"client," but merely representing himself in the litigation;122 and
that the finding of a violation of Rule 3.1 was not proven. 123 The
supreme court ruled that a demurrer cannot lie against a bar
complaint because "these proceedings do not authorize a review-
ing body to dismiss a complaint against a lawyer on demurrer."124
The court also held,
The Rules ... are designed to insure the integrity and fairness of the
legal process. It would be a manifest absurdity and a distortion of
115. Barrett, 272 Va. at 265-66, 634 S.E.2d at 343-44.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 265, 634 S.E.2d at 343.
118. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall provide compe-
tent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
119. Id. R. 3.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivol-
ous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of ex-
isting law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a pro-
ceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to
require that every element of the case be established.").
120. Id. R. 3.4(j) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not ... [flile a suit, initiate criminal
charges, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of
the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve mere-
ly to harass or maliciously injure another.").
121. Id. R. 4.4 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means
that have no purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use me-
thods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.").
122. Barrett, 272 Va. at 267, 634 S.E.2d at 345.
123. Id. at 271, 634 S.E.2d at 347.
124. Id. at 266, 634 S.E.2d at 344.
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these Rules if a lawyer representing himself commits an act that vi-
olates the Rules but is able to escape accountability for such viola-
tion solely because the lawyer is representing himself. 125
Finally, the court reversed the finding on the Rule 3.1 violation,
stating that "[a]n erroneous position is not necessarily a frivolous
position."126
J. Jurisdiction: Respondent's Election To Have Charges Heard by
Three-Judge Panel
By statute, a lawyer has the right to bypass the disciplinary
system developed by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Bar
and elect to have the charges of misconduct tried by a three-judge
court. 127 In Brown v. Virginia State Bar, a district committee cer-
tified charges of misconduct to the Disciplinary Board.128 Under
applicable rules of procedure, the respondent lawyer is required
to file an answer or file a demand that the charges be heard by a
three-judge court within twenty-one days after service of the cer-
tification.129 When the respondent lawyer filed his demand for a
three-judge court after the twenty-one day period had expired,
counsel for the Bar filed an objection, which it then withdrew.130
The Disciplinary Board ruled that the twenty-one day rule was
jurisdictional and could not be waived by counsel for the Bar.131
The Disciplinary Board proceeded to hear the case and suspended
the respondent's law license for one year. 132 On the respondent's
appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court ruled that
while the twenty-one day rule was jurisdictional in nature, it did
not involve subject matter jurisdiction. 133 Therefore, the twenty-
125. Id. at 268, 634 S.E.2d at 345.
126. Id. at 272, 634 S.E.2d at 348.
127. VA. SUP. CT. R., pt. 6, § IV, para. 13(H)(2)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008). The rule provides
that within twenty-one days of service of the charges of misconduct by a district commit-
tee, the respondent may demand that the proceedings be terminated and that the charges
be brought before a three-judge court. A nearly identical provision applies to charges of
misconduct filed with the Disciplinary Board. Id. para. 13(I)(1)(a)(1)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
2007).
128. Brown v. Va. State Bar, 270 Va. 409, 411, 621 S.E.2d 106, 107 (2005).
129. Id. at 412, 621 S.E.2d at 108.
130. Id. at 411, 621 S.E.2d at 107.
131. Id. at 412, 621 S.E.2d at 107.
132. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 108.
133. Id.
[Vol. 43:255
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
one day rule could be waived by the parties. 134 Because the Bar
counsel withdrew the objection and the respondent had not filed
an answer to charges with the Disciplinary Board, the Discipli-
nary Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 135 The court re-
versed the Disciplinary Board's decision and remanded the case
for hearing by a three-judge court. 136
On remand, a three-judge panel of a circuit court imposed a
public reprimand with terms on the respondent, whose actions
then went before the Disciplinary Board.137 The Disciplinary
Board noted that the respondent had "settled a wrongful death
suit on behalf of an infant client without informing the court or
counsel for the insurers about a potential, yet-to-be-born second
heir."138 In another matter, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, sanctioned
the respondent $9,885.43 for failing to respond to discovery and
for making misrepresentations in the courtroom." 139 For these
reasons, upon an agreed disposition of the charges, the respon-
dent was placed on disciplinary probation for one year, during
which time he could not commit any breach of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct and was required to complete six hours of eth-
ics education for no annual credit.140 On an appeal of right, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the three-
judge court. 14 1
In Robinson v. Virginia State Bar, the respondent lawyer's li-
cense was suspended for three years by the Disciplinary Board. 142
The respondent argued on appeal that the Disciplinary Board
erred in denying the appellant's request for a three-judge pan-
el.143 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Disciplinary
Board did not err in concluding that the respondent's request for
134. Id. at 413, 621 S.E.2d at 108.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In re Curtis Tyrone Brown, No. 04-021-0897 and 04-021-1103 (VSB Disc. Bd.
2006).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Brown v. Va. State Bar, ex rel. Second District Comm., No. 070162 (Va. Oct. 19,
2007).
142. Robinson v. Va. State Bar, No. 052638, slip op. at 1 (Va. May 19, 2006).
143. Id.
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a three-judge panel was untimely.144 The respondent's letter,
sent by certified mail on the twenty-first day after service of the
certification, was not received until the twenty-second day after
service of the certification.145 Moreover, the court stated, Rule
5:5(b) does not apply to pleadings filed with the Disciplinary
Board.146 The court also found that the respondent's unsigned re-
quest for a three-judge court, which was sent by facsimile on the
twenty-first day after service of the certification, was without ef-
fect. 147
K. Unbundling Legal Services: Preparation of a Lawsuit for a Pro
Se Litigant
Under Rule 1.2, a lawyer and a client may ethically agree to
limit the scope of representation.148 In Walker v. American Ass'n
of Professional Eye Care Specialists, the plaintiff engaged a law-
yer for a potential negligent medical treatment case and placed
$1500 in an escrow fund with him.149 A few months later, the
lawyer informed the plaintiff that he would not represent her in
the case. 150 A different law office subsequently drafted a motion
for judgment.151 The plaintiff, acting pro se, signed the pleading
herself and no lawyer signed it.152 The original lawyer arranged
for it to be delivered to the clerk of the circuit court with a cover
letter asking for the paper to be filed on behalf of the plaintiff.153
A check for the filing fee, drawn on the lawyer's trust account, ac-
companied the letter and pleading. 154 Defense counsel filed a mo-
tion to strike the pleading because it was signed by the plaintiff
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2; see VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5:5(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("Any document re-
quired to be filed with the clerk of this Court, or filed in the office of the clerk of this Court,
shall be deemed to be timely filed if it is mailed postage prepaid to the clerk of this Court
by registered or certified mail and if the official receipt therefor be exhibited upon demand
of the clerk or any party and it shows mailing within the prescribed time limits.").
147. Robinson, No. 052638, slip op. at 2.
148. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R.1.2(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer may limit the objec-
tives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.").
149. Walker v. Am. Ass'n of Prof'l Eye Care Specialists, 268 Va. 117, 119, 597 S.E.2d
47, 48 (2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 120-21, 597 S.E.2d at 48.
153. Id. at 119, 597 S.E.2d at 48.
154. Id.
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and not counsel of record as required under the rules of proce-
dure.155 The circuit court agreed, finding that the plaintiff was
"represented by counsel" and therefore her pleading was invalid
because it was not signed by a member of the Bar.156 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded the case,
holding that the lawyer who filed the suit and filing fee on plain-
tiffs behalf was not her "counsel of record" and that the plaintiff
had properly signed the pleading as an unrepresented party in
compliance with the rules.1 57
III. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
A. Ex Parte Contacts with Represented Parties
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a law-
yer from communicating with a represented party.S8 If a corpo-
ration is represented by counsel in a case, the question becomes
which employees in the company are considered to be
"represented by counsel?" A related issue is whether a lawyer
may conduct an ex parte interview of a former employee of a com-
pany that is represented by counsel. This issue is thoroughly ad-
dressed in Bryant v. Yorktowne Cabinetry, Inc.159 The defendant
company filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to prohibit
the plaintiffs counsel from interviewing former employees of the
company.l 60 The Supreme Court of Virginia, adopting the ap-
proach taken by the Virginia State Bar's Standing Committee on
Legal Ethics, held that Rule 4.2 generally does not prohibit an ex
parte interview of a represented company's former employee.161
However, if the interviewing lawyer inquires into matters that
involve privileged communications by and between the former
155. Id. at 119-20, 597 S.E.2d at 48.
156. Id. at 120, 597 S.E.2d at 48.
157. Id. at 120-21, 597 S.E.2d at 48-49.
158. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 4.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("In representing a client, a law-
yer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the law-
yer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.").
159. 538 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Va. 2008).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 949.
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employee and the company's counsel related to the subject of the
representation, such conduct would be prohibited by Rule 4.2.162
TV. LEGAL ETHICS OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE VIRGINIA STATE
BAR'S STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS
A. Partnership with a Non-Lawyer
Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers
from practicing in a firm if a non-lawyer has an ownership inter-
est in or a controlling position in the firm.163 The rule also prohi-
bits lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers.164 Howev-
er, Legal Ethics Opinion 1843165 of the Virginia State Bar's
Standing Committee on Legal Ethics (the "Committee") ad-
dressed a conflicting federal regulation applicable to patent prac-
titioners that allowed patent lawyers to partner with non-lawyer
registered patent examiners.166 The question presented was
whether a member of the Bar who practices patent law can be
employed by the firm as a patent attorney and share legal fees
with a non-lawyer registered patent agent.167 The opinion relies
on federal regulations that essentially permit patent lawyers to
form partnerships and share fees with registered patent agents to
the extent the shared fees arise from the practice of patent law
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.168 The
opinion holds that this issue is pre-empted by federal law under
162. Id. at 953.
163. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 5.4(d) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
164. Id. R. 5.4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
165. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1843 (2008).
166. A practitioner is defined in 37 C.F.R. § 10.1(r) (2007) as "(1) an attorney or agent
registered to practice before the Office in patent cases or (2) an individual authorized un-
der 5 U.S.C. 500(b) or otherwise as provided by this subchapter, to practice before the Of-
fice in trademark cases or other non-patent cases."
167. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1843 (2008).
168. Id. 37 C.F.R. § 10.48 (2007) permits a lawyer/practitioner to share legal fees with
a non-lawyer practitioner.
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the Sperry doctrine169 and the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. 170
B. Conflicts Arising When Lawyer Serves as a Public Official
Rule 1.11(b) generally prohibits a lawyer from representing a
private client in a matter in which the lawyer participated perso-
nally and substantially as a public official.171 Legal Ethics Opi-
nion 1841 addresses the ethical obligations of a lawyer who is a
member of a local town's governing body and recently voted for
the adoption of the abusive driver fees statute as local law that
was incorporated into the locality's traffic code.172 The lawyer
then represented a defendant charged with a traffic code violation
who wanted to challenge the constitutionality of the newly
enacted ordinance. 173 The Committee opined that although there
is no per se prohibition against the lawyer's representation in
these circumstances, Rule 1.11(b) requires that the lawyer obtain
the consent of both the private client and the government agency
after full disclosure and consultation regarding the potential con-
flict.174 Additionally, the lawyer must analyze the requirements
of Rule 1.7(a)(2) as to any material limitation in his representa-
tion based upon personal interests. 175 Further, such a limitation
on the lawyer's representation might involve foregoing a potential
challenge of constitutionality, thereby raising issues concerning
the lawyer's diligence and competence in the representation. 176
169. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1843 (2008); see Sperry v. Florida
ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1963) (holding that a state cannot enforce its
unauthorized-practice laws to prohibit a non-lawyer registered patent agent from practic-
ing before the Patent and Trademark Office if federal law authorizes the non-lawyer to do
so); see also VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § I, Unauthorized Practice R. 9-102(A)(2) (Repl. Vol.
2008) (permitting a non-lawyer to practice before an administrative agency if the agency's
rules permit non-lawyer practice).
170. Article Six of the Constitution of the United States states in pertinent part: "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
171. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.11(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
172. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1841 (2008).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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C. Assisting a Client in Conduct That Is Fraudulent-Real
Estate Practice
In Legal Ethics Opinion 1840, an employee transfers real es-
tate to a relocation company. 177 The relocation company purchas-
es the employee's real estate using a deed which is not record-
ed.178 When the ultimate buyer purchases the real estate, the
lawyer for the relocation company drafts the deed transferring
the property from the original seller to the buyer by substituting
a second front page over the original deed from the seller to the
relocation company.1 79 The Committee opined that this conduct
clearly involves fraud and is unethical.180 The opinion concludes
that the buyer's lawyer has a duty under Rule 8.3 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct to report unethical conduct by the reloca-
tion company's lawyer.181
D. Counsel for Corporation Providing Services to an Affiliated
Company
Legal Ethics Opinion 1838 addresses whether a corporation
can lend its in-house counsel to a sister corporation to provide le-
gal services when both corporations are owned by the same par-
ent corporation.182 If so, may the corporation bill the sister corpo-
ration for those legal services, and to what extent? A patent
lawyer, who is also a regular member of the Bar, is employed by
Corporation A to draft and prosecute patent applications in order
to protect the discoveries/inventions that Corporation A has ac-
quired.183 Corporation B has a need for legal advice regarding pa-
tent infringement and/or the validity of patents held by third par-
177. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1840 (2007).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R.1.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to de-
termine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.").
181. VSB Comm. On Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1840 (2007); see VA. SuP. CT. R. pt.
6, § II, R. 8.3(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer having reliable information that another law-
yer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substan-
tial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.").
182. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1838 (2007).
183. Id.
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ties. 184 Corporation A and Corporation B are two of several pri-
vately held corporations in a Group, "all of which are directly or
indirectly owned exclusively by a single corporate entity."185 Cor-
poration A and Corporation B, although commonly owned by the
same parent company, do not own any part of each other. 186 The
Committee began its analysis with the well-established rule that
a lay corporation generally may not employ a lawyer to provide
legal services to third parties such as customers of Corporation
A.187 Nevertheless, the Committee opined that the patent lawyer
"can provide legal services to Corporation B as long as [the patent
lawyer] provides those services to Corporation B directly, inde-
pendently, and free of any conflicts of interest and with the con-
sent of Corporation A."188 In addition, because the lawyer is a
regular, active member of the Bar, "he is authorized to practice
law generally and may represent clients other than his employer,
Corporation A."189
Lawyers admitted to practice as corporate counsel, a limited
admission granted to out-of-state lawyers not generally admitted
in Virginia, but who serve as in-house counsel to an employer in
Virginia, may also render legal services to an affiliate of their
employer. 190 The Committee cautioned, however, that the lawyer
in question must always be clear who the lawyer's client is and to
whom counsel owes undivided loyalty and confidentiality. 191 In
fact, discharging the lawyer's obligations may require the patent
lawyer to work off-site at a physically separate office, rather than
on the premises of Corporation A.192
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Assoc., 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153
(1937)).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see, e.g., VSB Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Unauthorized Practice
of Law, Op. 211 (2006) (noting that a Virginia lawyer serving as corporate counsel does not
need separate law office to provide legal services to pro bono clients).
190. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1838 (2007); see VA. SUP. CT. R.
1A:5 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("Employer" includes: "for-profit or a non-profit corporation, associa-
tion, or other business entity, including its subsidiaries and affiliates .... ) (emphasis
added).
191. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1838 (2007).
192. Id.
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Citing a prior legal ethics opinion, the Committee stated that
it is improper for a lawyer's corporate employer or parent company to
charge and collect legal fees for work done by its corporate lawyer
unless the fee is simply a reimbursement to the corporate employer
for the actual cost of the legal work provided by the lawyer .... In
other words, corporate counsel cannot be used to generate profits for
an employer, as that would be considered fee splitting with a non-
lawyer and a violation of Rule 5.4(a). 19 3
E. Confidentiality: A Prospective Client's Communications with
Lawyer's Secretary
What happens when a prospective client communicates infor-
mation about her legal matter to a secretary in a law firm who is
currently representing the adverse party? Legal Ethics Opinion
1832 addresses the general conflict of interest for a lawyer cur-
rently representing an ex-husband when the wife, as a prospec-
tive client, discusses the details of her case with the attorney's
secretary. 194 The lawyer does not take the case, and the question
becomes whether or not it is ethically permissible for the lawyer
to continue to represent the ex-husband against the wife. The
opinion held that even though the wife never retained the lawyer
and never became a client, the lawyer still owes a duty of confi-
dentiality.195 The Committee found, however, that because no in-
formation had been imparted to the attorney, the secretary could
be screened and the lawyer could continue the representation of
the ex-husband.196
Citing to a prior opinion,197 the Committee observed that "the
ethical obligation to protect confidential information of a prospec-
tive client encourages people to seek early legal assistance and
such persons must be comfortable that the information imparted
to a lawyer while seeking legal assistance will not be used against
them."198 The fact that the wife in the present scenario never re-
tained the lawyer and never became a client does not relieve the
lawyer of this duty of confidentiality. 199 In this case, however, the
193. Id. (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 5.4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
194. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1832 (2007).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1794 (2004)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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prospective client spoke only with the secretary and has no direct
contact with the lawyer. 200
Thus, "[t]o avoid the imputation of confidential information to
the lawyer, and possible disqualification, the lawyer has an ethi-
cal duty to establish a screen between the secretary and lawyer
as to [the wife] and the ex-husband's case."201 The lawyer must
instruct the secretary that she cannot reveal to the lawyer any
confidential information obtained from the wife.202 Finally, the
Committee noted, to preserve information protected by Rule
1.6,203 "the lawyer must use another staff person in lieu of the
secretary for any work performed relating to the representation of
the ex-husband against [the wife] and should send a written
communication to [the wife] or her lawyer that these measures
have been taken."204
F. Potential Conflicts for Attorney-Mediators When Clients Move
from Mediation to Legal Representation
Legal Ethics Opinion 1826 addresses potential conflicts of in-
terest faced by two lawyers who, in addition to their work in their
law firm, work as mediators in a separate mediation firm.205 In
this scenario, members of the mediation firm refer customers to
the law practice when mediation is unsuccessful.206 The opinion
concludes that where the referring mediator is either of the two
lawyers, Rule 2.10(e) 207 creates a conflict of interest that is im-
puted to the other lawyer via Rule 1.10.208 Rule 2.10(e) would not
let the lawyer who served as mediator in the matter cure the con-
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.6 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (duty to protect confidentiality of
client information).
204. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1832 (2007).
205. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1826 (2006).
206. Id.
207. VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 2.10(e) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer who serves or has
served as a third party neutral may not serve as a lawyer on behalf of any party to the
dispute, nor represent one such party against the other in any legal proceeding related to
the subject of the dispute resolution proceeding.").
208. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1826 (2006); see VA. SUP. CT. R. pt.
6, § II, R. 1.10(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohi-
bited from doing so by Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, or 2.10(e).").
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flict with consent.209 In contrast, the second lawyer could cure
her imputed conflict via consent, as allowed in Rule 1.10.210
Where the referring source is a mediator other than the two at-
torneys in the firm, Rule 2.10 would not apply, though the law-
yers should review whether they would have a personal or busi-
ness interest conflict under Rule 1.7 (as the referring mediator is
in their mediation firm).211 Whether such a conflict exists in a
particular instance depends on facts not presented in the opinion
hypothetical (such as how the mediation firm operates and
whether mediators discuss cases amongst themselves, etc.).
G. Criminal Law-Scope of Representation-Decisions Made by
the Client
Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct addresses the
scope of the representation and specifies particular decisions that
only the client can make. 212 In a criminal case, the lawyer must
"abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer,
as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and wheth-
er the client will testify."213 In Legal Ethics Opinion 1823 a public
defender waived his client's right to a jury trial without consult-
ing the client.214 The public defender informed the court and the
prosecutor of that election without mentioning that the lawyer
had not consulted with the client. 215
This opinion concludes that the lawyer violated Rule 1.2 re-
garding scope of authority, as that rule expressly carves out the
waiver of a jury trial as exclusively the prerogative of the
client.216 Given the unlikelihood that the public defender was ig-
norant of this fundamental legal principle, the opinion also con-
cludes that the lawyer's election of a bench trial was tantamount
to a misrepresentation to the court, as the court and the prosecu-
tor would have assumed the client had been consulted per Rule
209. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1826 (2006).
210. Id. (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.10(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A disqualification
prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in
Rule 1.7.")).
211. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1826 (2006).
212. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
213. Id. R. 1.2(a).
214. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1823 (2006).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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1.2.217 The Committee also cited other authorities holding that a
lawyer cannot surrender a criminal defendant's right to a trial by
jury.21 8
H. Lawyer Leaving a Law Firm-Notification to Clients
When a lawyer leaves a law firm, the lawyers remaining in the
firm are often concerned about the departing lawyer's contact
with the firm's clients. In Legal Ethics Opinion 1822, the Com-
mittee addressed whether it is unethical for a departing associate
to refuse the firm's request for copies of notice letters he wrote to
clients advising them of his departure and a list of the clients he
contacted.2i 9 The request for opinion also asked whether the par-
ticular text of the notice letter sent to clients is misleading:
After over 6 years, I have decided to leave First Firm to join Second
Firm. The Virginia State Bar Ethics Counsel indicates that you
should be advised of my departure from First Firm and that you
should be informed of the following options: I can continue
representing you in trademark matters, you can hire other counsel,
or you can stay with First Firm.2 2 0
The opinion concludes that there is no ethical duty to provide
the information regarding the notice letter to the firm, though the
opinion does not endorse secrecy. 221 The opinion finds that the
language of the particular notice, which conforms to the require-
ments established in Legal Ethics Opinion 1332,222 was not mis-
leading. 223
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-257 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (allowing for bench trials for
felony cases only where the accused consents after being advised by counsel); see VA. SUP.
CT. R. 3A:13(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008) (allowing for a bench trial in circuit court only after the
court determines that the accused's consent was voluntarily and intelligently given); see
also Jones v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 636, 641, 484 S.E.2d 618, 621 (Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that an attorney may not, without client authorization, surrender an accused's
right to a jury trial).
219. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1822 (2006).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1332 (1990) (holding a departing
lawyer's notice to clients should inform the client he can freely choose to go with the de-
parting attorney, stay with the firm, or go with new counsel).
223. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1822 (2006).
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I. Conflict of Interest-Lawyer Suing Corporation When Partner
Sits on Board
In Legal Ethics Opinion 1821, the Committee determined that
it is a conflict of interest for a lawyer to sue a corporate defendant
when a lawyer's partner sits on the defendant's board of direc-
tors.224 Applying Rule 1.7(a)(2), 225 the Committee found that the
partner sitting on the defendant company's board has a fiduciary
relationship that would materially limit the representation of the
plaintiff against the corporation. 226 This conflict is imputed to the
other lawyers in the firm under Rule 1.10(a) and is, therefore, a
conflict for the partner representing the plaintiff.227 The Commit-
tee stated that "[c]ourts have repeatedly found this tension be-
tween corporate fiduciary duty and the duty to a client as the
source of a conflict of interest."228 The Committee then turned to
the issue of whether the conflict can be cured. Conflicts under
Rule 1.7 may be cured, the Committee noted, with the informed
consent of the affected clients. 229 The two lawyers wrote to the
president of the defendant corporation and proposed that the
partner serving on the board be recused from participating in any
discussion or voting on any matter related to the lawsuit.230 Al-
though recusal is not mentioned in the Rules of Professional Con-
duct as a means for curing a conflict, the Committee stated that it
is a factor to consider if recusal resolves the tension between the
224. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1821 (2006).
225. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.7(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2008) (A conflict exists if "there is
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a per-
sonal interest of the lawyer.").
226. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1821 (2006).
227. Id.; see also supra note 208.
228. Id. (citing Allen v. Academic Games Leagues of Am., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 785, 788-
90 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (disqualifying firm of organization's advisory board member from re-
presentation of party suing that entity); Berry v. Saline Mem'l Hosp., 907 S.W.2d 736,
739-40 (Ark. 1995) (disqualifying firm of former hospital board member from representing
patient against the Board); William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232,
236, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (disqualifying firm of bank trustee from representation of
plaintiff adverse to the bank); Graf v. Frame, 352 S.E.2d 31, 37-39 (W. Va. 1986) (disqua-
lifying attorney who serves on a university's board of regents from representing persons
with claims against faculty members)).
229. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1821 (2006). Both Rules 1.7 and
1.10 provide that it may be possible to cure a conflict with the consent of the clients. See
VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.7(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008); VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.10(c)
(Repl. Vol. 2008).
230. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1821 (2006).
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attorney's fiduciary duty to the board and his professional obliga-
tion to his clients:
The Committee thinks that this is possible, if the board has approved
of the recusal strategy, after consultation with its attorney. Presum-
ably the Board would consider such matters as whether the litigation
is "routine" or "non-routine" in the course of the board's business;
whether the claim goes to matters that have been determined by the
board, or by lower level administrative staff; and whether the claim
involves matters on which Attorney B has voted or has been involved
in. Under the right circumstances, the risk of diluted loyalty to this
client could be significantly reduced. Attorney B's recusal could be ef-
fective in two ways. First that recusal would substantially reduce the
opportunity for improper influence between Attorney B and the
board. Similarly, Attorney B's recusal lessens the risk that Attorney
C would be improperly loyal to the corporation at the expense of his
clients. Attorney B's recusal could facilitate the competent, diligent
representation of the plaintiffs. 2 3 1
The Committee also indicated that Attorney B's resignation
more than likely cured the conflict, but that could not be guaran-
teed:
The end of Attorney B's role as a board member presumably would
end his fiduciary duty to the Trust Company. As he never
represented the company, Rule 1.9's requirements regarding duty of
loyalty to former clients would not be triggered. However, if the cor-
porate documents establishing the specifics of the duties of Trust
Company board members included some duty to avoid adverse busi-
ness actions regarding the Trust Company for some period after
board membership, then Attorney B's resignation would not neces-
sarily cure this conflict. That lingering duty could possibly create the
sort of conflict already established for current board membership.
Similarly, if the corporate documents establish a duty to keep certain
corporate information confidential, that duty may also continue
beyond the term of the attorney's service on the board. 2 32
J. Ex Parte Contacts with Represented Persons
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a law-
yer from communicating with a party that is represented by
counsel. 2 3 3 Legal Ethics Opinion 1820 presents a scenario in
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 4.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("In representing a client, a law-
yer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the law-
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which lawyers are working in-house for a railroad company as
claims adjusters. 234 As claims agents, they contact injured rail-
road workers, who have legal representation, to persuade them
they do not need legal representation and to obtain information
about their injuries and their medical needs.235 The central ques-
tion is whether these lawyer/claims agents are governed by Rule
4.2's prohibition against contacting represented parties without
consent of counsel. 236 Critical to the analysis, the Committee
noted, is the introductory language to Rule 4.2 "in representing a
client."237 The opinion concludes that the work of these attor-
ney/claims agents involved negotiating claims against the rail-
road and thus involved the provision of legal services. 238 Accord-
ingly, the attorney/claims agents must work within the restric-
tions of Rule 4.2 in their communications with the represented,
injured workers. 239 The opinion emphasizes the supervisory re-
sponsibilities of the attorney, who serves as head of the claims
department under Rules 5.1 and 5.3, to ensure that the conduct of
the lawyers and non-lawyers serving as claims agents perform
their responsibilities ethically under the Rules of Professional
Conduct.240
K. Conflict of Interest--Lawyer Working as a Lobbyist Rather
Than in an Attorney-Client Relationship
Is a lawyer subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct when
he or she is working as a lobbyist? In Legal Ethics Opinion 1819,
the Committee reiterated its position that a lawyer may be sub-
ject to the Rules of Professional Conduct even when engaged in
activity that falls outside the traditional attorney-client relation-
ship.241 Accordingly, the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to a
yer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer of is authorized by law to do so.").
234. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1820 (2006).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1819 (2005) (citing VSB Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1764 (2002) (attorney fee sharing with finance company);
VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1754 (2001) (attorney selling life insurance
products); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1658 (1995) (employment law
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lawyer when working as a lobbyist in a lobbying firm.242 This
means, quite possibly, that the conflicts of interest rules that ap-
ply to lawyers may also apply to a lawyer working as a lobbyist
who undertakes to represent customers that have directly ad-
verse interests in matters on which the lawyer/lobbyist is work-
ing.243 However, this would be the case only if the lawyer/lobbyist
held himself out or acted in such a way so as to cause the custom-
er to reasonably believe that an attorney-client relationship was
created during the lobbying engagement. 244 In this opinion, the
lobbying firm's promotional literature and website state that the
lawyer/lobbyist 'is an attorney with many years of experience in
both business and government' who has 'dealt successfully with
many legal, governmental and other crises."'245 In meetings with
the customer, the lawyer/lobbyist would often preface his remarks
with statements like, "As a lawyer, I think you should emphasize
these issues."246 The customer reasonably believed that the law-
yer/lobbyist was giving legal advice and applying his skills as a
lawyer in the course of the lobbying engagement and the firm's
contract and literature said nothing to disavow that belief.247
In this opinion, the Committee warned:
While neither the lawyer, nor the firm, may have intended to estab-
lish an attorney/client relationship, the Committee is sympathetic to
A's impression to the contrary. When a lawyer establishes a relation-
firm/human resources consulting firm); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op.
1647 (1995) (employee-owned title agency); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op.
1634 (1995) (accounting firm); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1584 (1994)
(partnership with non-lawyer); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1579 (1994)
(serving as fiduciary such as guardian or executor); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal
Ethics Op. 1442 (1991) (lender's agent); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op.
1368 (1990) (mediation/arbitration services); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics
Op. 1345 (1990) (court reporting); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1318
(1990) (consulting firm); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1311 (1989) (in-
surance products); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1254 (1989) (bail bonds);
VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1198 (1989) (court reporting); VSB Comm.
on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1163 (1988) (accountant; tax preparation); VSB Comm.
on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1131 (1988) (realty corporation); VSB Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1083 (1988) (non-legal services subsidiary); VSB Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1016 (1987) (billing services firm); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics,
Legal Ethics Op. 187 (1982) (title insurance).
242. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1819 (2005).
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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ship to provide other than legal services and the customer knows he
is a lawyer, the lawyer must be cognizant of this opportunity for con-
fusion. Unless the services clearly have no connection to legal train-
ing and expertise (e.g., a lawyer-owned restaurant), the lawyer
should accept an affirmative duty to clarify the boundaries of the
business relationship. The Committee suggests that such a duty is
present in many nonlegal endeavors: for example, mediation, finan-
cial planning, and, as in the present hypothetical, lobbying services.
This affirmative duty belongs on the part of the lawyer, rather than
the customer, in that the lawyer is in the more informed position re-
garding the nature of his services and the details of the ethical
rules.2 48
Assuming the lawyer/lobbyist had a conflict of interest in
representing customers on lobbying matters that were directly
adverse, is this conflict imputed throughout the lobbying firm as
it would with a law firm? The Committee opined that because the
other lobbyists in the firm were not lawyers, the lawyer/lobbyist's
conflict is not imputed, making it possible for another non-lawyer
lobbyist in the firm to take over the conflicting engagement. 249
L. Maintaining Client Files in Electronic or Digital Form
In this digital age, some law firms are striving toward the "pa-
perless office." Legal Ethics Opinion 1818 acknowledges the pos-
sibility that a client's file could be kept only in electronic format,
rather than in paper as well, without violating any ethics
rules. 250 The opinion reaches three conclusions. First, there is no
express ethical requirement regarding the form in which an at-
torney must maintain client files.251 Therefore, a lawyer may
generally maintain an electronic filing system but must accom-
modate those particular items for which a paper version is signif-
icant or required, such as a holographic will. 252 Second, although
generally a lawyer may ask a client to consent to the destruction
of paper documents, he should not ask for that consent where de-
struction of a particular item would prejudice the client. 253 Third,
a lawyer may generally ask a client to consent to an electronic-
only file but must limit that request with regard to any paper
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1818 (2005).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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document that is needed for protection of the client's interests. 254
The opinion notes that a lawyer must not breach his duty of com-
petence in his zeal to move to an all-electronic filing system and
that the lawyer must instruct any outside computer technical as-
sistants about the duty of confidentiality.255
M. Criminal Law-Defense Lawyer's Obligation upon Missing
Deadline for Filing Client's Appeal
Legal Ethics Opinion 1817 addresses the proper course of ac-
tion for a lawyer who is responsible for his client's missed appeal
date.256 The opinion concludes that Rule 1.4's duty of communica-
tion 257 requires the attorney to inform the client about the error
and what is needed to correct it.258 Also, numerous other sug-
gested steps regarding the filing of the habeas petition are
deemed permissible in light of new Virginia Code section 19.2-
321.1 (effective July 1, 2005).259 That statute requires the attor-
ney to assist the defendant in preparing an affidavit and petition
for a late appeal wherein the attorney acknowledges his or her
complete responsibility for the error. 260 The opinion holds that
the statute overrules prior ethics opinions stating that the errant
lawyer had a conflict of interest in assisting the client under
these circumstances. 261 As permitted, if not required by the sta-
254. Id.
255. Id. at n.2.
256. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1817 (2005).
257. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.4 (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("(a) A lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information; (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably ne-
cessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; (c) A
lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from
another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter.").
258. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1817 (2005) ("If a lawyer fails to act
on a client's case, the lawyer has a duty to promptly notify the client of this failure and of
the possible claim the client may thus have against the lawyer, even if such advice is
against the lawyer's own interests." (citing In re Higginson, 664 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Ind.
1996); Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 643 (N.J. 1997); In re Tallon, 447 N.Y.S.2d 50, 50
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982))). For example, a lawyer who fails to file suit within the statute of
limitations period must so inform the client, pointing out the possibility of a malpractice
suit and the resulting conflict of interest that may require the lawyer to withdraw. RESTA-
TEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c (2000).
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-321.1 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
260. Id.
261. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1817 (2005). In Legal Ethics Opi-
nion 1122, the Committee concluded that generally a lawyer should not represent his own
client in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as '"e would have to assert a
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tute, the opinion holds that the attorney may assist with the ha-
beas petition.262
N. Criminal Law-Impaired Client Wants To Forego Defense in
Capital Murder Case
In Legal Ethics Opinion 1816, the Committee addressed the
ethical dilemma of defense counsel in a capital murder case
whose suicidal client instructs the lawyers to forego putting on a
defense.263 In an earlier opinion, Legal Ethics Opinion 1737
(1999), the Committee had suggested that for a lawyer to properly
follow a client's directive regarding an important decision, the
lawyer should have a reasonable basis to believe that the client is
able to make a rational, stable decision. 264 In the earlier opinion,
the client was competent and directed his capital defense lawyers
to forego putting on mitigating evidence in the penalty stage, if
the client was found guilty. 265 In contrast, in the current opinion,
the client's suicidal tendencies and other information give the de-
fense counsel a reasonable basis that the client is not able to
make informed, rational, stable decisions about his defense.266
When a client is impaired, the lawyer must take guidance from
Rule 1.14 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.267 The Committee
observed that the fact the client was found competent to stand
trial did not dispose of the ethical considerations:
position which would expose him to personal liability." VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal
Ethics Op. 1122 (1988). Similarly, in Legal Ethics Opinion 1558, the Committee concluded
that an attorney could not argue on behalf of a client that the attorney himself had impro-
perly pressured the client into accepting a guilty plea. The Ethics Committee found that
the conflict between the attorney's need to pursue the interest of the client yet also protect
himself meant that consent could not properly cure the conflict of interest. VSB Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1558 (1993). To the extent that those prior opinions are in-
consistent with the assistance the lawyer is permitted, if not required, to provide under
Va. Code section 19.2-321.1, they are overruled.
262. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1817 (2005).
263. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1816 (2005).
264. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1737 (1999).
265. Id.
266. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1816 (2005).
267. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.14(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ('When the lawyer reasona-
bly believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, fi-
nancial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting
with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in
appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guar-
dian.").
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The facts state that a forensic psychologist evaluated the client and
concluded that he is competent to stand trial. The committee sug-
gests that the evaluation's conclusion does not necessarily remove
this attorney and client from the application of Rule 1.14. The de-
termination of competency to stand trial is specific enough such that
a client may have been determined competent for trial but nonethe-
less under impairment with regard to making decisions involving the
matter. Also, the facts do not state when the evaluation was done; if
the client's mental state has deteriorated since that time, the attor-
ney again should consider obtaining a new evaluation.2 6 8
The Committee therefore concluded that Rule 1.14 may none-
theless support defense counsel disregarding the client's "death
wish" directive if counsel conclude that their client cannot make
"adequately considered decisions" regarding the representation
such that protective action is needed.269
0. Lawyer Advertising-Use of the Terms 'Affiliated with" or
'Associated with"
Can two law firms use the term "affiliated" or "associated" to
describe the relationship between the firms on their letterhead?
In Legal Ethics Opinion 1813, the Standing Committee on Legal
Ethics and the Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation issued a joint opinion answering this question in the
affirmative, provided certain requirements and qualifications are
met.270 The opinion looks to ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 84-
351271 to support the conclusion that two firms may use these
terms only if they regularly work together on cases (as with the
term "of counsel") and if the two firms share conflicts of inter-
est.2 72 In any other circumstances, use of the terms "affiliated
268. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1816 (2005).
269. Id.
270. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics and VSB Comm. on Lawyer Adver. & Solicitation,
Legal Ethics Op. 1813 (2005).
271. ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Formal Ethics Op. 84-351
(1984).
272. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics and VSB Comm. on Lawyer Adver. & Solicitation,
Legal Ethics Op. 1813 (2005).
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with" or "associated with" violates Rules 7.1273 and 7.5274 in that
they are misleading. 275
P. Fee Agreements-Termination by Client-Conversion Clause
Can a lawyer permissibly include in a fee agreement a provi-
sion allowing for alternative fee arrangements should the client
terminate representation mid-case without cause? Sometimes re-
ferred to as "conversion clauses," the Committee addressed this
issue in Legal Ethics Opinion 1812.276 An attorney who regularly
represents plaintiffs in personal injury cases wants to include the
following language in her standard contingent fee agreement:
Either Client or Attorney has the absolute right to terminate this
agreement. In the event Client terminates this agreement, the rea-
sonable value of Attorney's services shall be valued at $200 per hour
for attorney time and $65 per hour for legal assistant time for all
services rendered. In the alternative, the Attorney may, where per-
mitted by law, elect compensation based on the agreed contingency
fee for any settlement offer made to Client prior to termination. 2 7 7
The Committee could not determine whether the language in
the second sentence is attempting to establish an alternative con-
tractual hourly fee arrangement or attempting to establish an
agreed upon hourly rate to be used in employing a quantum me-
ruit calculation. 278 Rule 1.5(b) requires that the fee arrangement
be adequately explained to the client, preferably in writing. 279
The Committee opined that the second sentence of the proposed
language fails to meet this requirement of Rule 1.5(b).280 The
opinion concludes that the third sentence "is likewise improper as
273. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 7.1(a) (Repl. Vol. 2008) ("A lawyer shall not, on behalf
of the lawyer or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the firm, use or participate
in the use of any form of public communication if such communication contains a false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or claim.").
274. Id. R. 7.5(a) ("A lawyer or law firm may use or participate in the use of a profes-
sional card, professional announcement card, office sign, letterheads, telephone directory
listing, law list, legal directory listing, website, or a similar professional notice or device
unless it includes a statement or claim that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or decep-
tive.").
275. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics and VSB Comm. on Lawyer Adver. & Solicitation,
Legal Ethics Op. 1813 (2005).
276. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1812 (2005).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.5(b) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
280. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1812 (2005).
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it is misleading and fails to fully and properly inform the client of
the lawyer's entitlement to compensation in the event the client
terminates the representation prior to a recovery from the defen-
dant."281
Q. Lawyer's Obligation To Protect Former Client's Confidences
and Secrets
In Legal Ethics Opinion 1811, the Committee addressed a sce-
nario in which two co-executors of an estate were separately
represented by counsel. 282 The co-executors enter into a contract
in which each agree to share financial information with the other
so that they can carry out their fiduciary administration of the es-
tate. 283 Co-executor 1 discharges Attorney A, and Attorney A for-
wards the client's file to a successor attorney.284 Counsel for Co-
executor 2 contacts Attorney A and asks for certain financial in-
formation from Attorney A's former client's file to complete a tax
filing.285 However, Co-executor 1 will not consent to Attorney A's
release of the documents.286 The question presented is whether
Attorney A is obligated or permitted to release to counsel for Co-
executor 2 the requested financial information. 287
The Committee noted first that a lawyer's duty of confidentiali-
ty continues even after the representation is terminated. 288 The
next issue is whether the contract executed by the two co-
executors permitted disclosure of the financial information as re-
quired by law under Rule 1.6 (b)(1).289 The Committee concluded
that the contract between the co-executors was not "law" requir-
ing Attorney A to reveal the financial information over the former
client's objection:
281. Id.
282. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1811 (2005).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. ("Comment 22 to Rule 1.6 clarifies that the 'duty of confidentiality continues
after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."'); see also VSB Comm. on Legal Eth-
ics, Legal Ethics Ops. 812 (1986), 1207 (1989), 1664 (1996). Thus, even though Attorney A
no longer represents Co-executor #1, he must nevertheless maintain the confidentiality of
his former client's information.
289. Id.
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Rule 1.6(b)(1) carves out an exception to the general ethical duty of
confidentiality when needed to comply with "law." This committee
opines that a contract is not "law." Black's Law Dictionary provides
an extensive discussion of the concept encompassed by that term,
with suggested definitions including, "a body of rules of action or
conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal
force," and "that which must be obeyed and followed by citizens sub-
ject to sanctions or legal consequences." The entry in Black's for
"law" includes an extensive list of judicial authorities finding a laun-
dry list of items within the reach of that term. In sum, that list is li-
mited to statutes, judicial rulings, and various types of administra-
tive regulations and rulings. Contracts, such as the agreement in
this hypothetical, are not within that list.2 90
The Committee determined that Attorney A was proper in declin-
ing to provide the requested documents and instead referring the
requester to the former client's new attorney.291
R. Garnishment of Advanced Legal Fee Held in Trust Account
May a former attorney garnish a former client's advanced fee
paid to a new lawyer? Legal Ethics Opinion 1807 concludes that
this is permissible.292 A client terminates his relationship with
Attorney A during the course of litigation. The client then hires
Attorney B.293 The client has an unpaid balance with Attorney A
for attorney's fees, and Attorney A obtains a judgment against the
client for them.294 Attempting to collect on the judgment, Attor-
ney A causes a garnishment summons to be served on Attorney B
as garnishee. 295 The opinion concludes that it is permissible for
the former attorney to garnish the funds in the new attorney's
trust account.296 The opinion rests on the principle that money
paid by a client held in the attorney's trust account to pay for fu-
ture services remains the property of the client.297
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1807 (2004).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.; see also Marcus, Santoro & Kozak v. Wu, 274 Va. 743, 755, 652 S.E.2d 777,
783 (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION
The practice of law is changing and the professional regulation
of lawyers struggles to keep pace with these changes. Lawyers in-
creasingly need guidance on legal ethics issues related to their
practice. Although lawyers can be disciplined for violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, they can also reduce the risks of
receiving a bar complaint by contacting the Office of Ethics Coun-
sel when confronted with an ethical dilemma. The law governing
lawyers and legal ethics has evolved into a complex, specialized
area of the law. Lawyers can no longer rely on the "smell test" to
properly resolve an ethical dilemma.

